

Asymmetric Structure-Preserving Subgraph Queries for Large Graphs

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Abstract—One fundamental type of query for graph databases is subgraph isomorphism queries (a.k.a *subgraph queries*). Due to the computational hardness of subgraph queries coupled with the cost of managing massive graph data, outsourcing the query computation to a third-party service provider has been an economical and scalable approach. However, confidentiality is known to be an important attribute of Quality of Service (QoS) in Query as a Service (QaaS). In this paper, we propose the first practical private approach for subgraph query services, *asymmetric structure-preserving subgraph query processing*, where the data graph is publicly known and the query structure/topology is kept secret. Unlike other previous methods for subgraph queries, this paper proposes a series of novel optimizations that only exploit graph structures, *not the queries*. Further, we propose a robust query encoding and adopt the novel cyclic group based encryption so that query processing is transformed into a series of private matrix operations. Our experiments confirm that our techniques are efficient and the optimizations are effective.

I. INTRODUCTION

Subgraph queries (via subgraph isomorphism) are a fundamental and powerful query in various real graph applications. In particular, it is fundamental to various modern graph queries, such as graph pattern queries [1] and ontology-based matching [28]. While it is well known that subgraph queries are NP-hard, there has been significant research progress on enhancing their performance, *e.g.*, [7], [14], [25], [29]. A recent attempt has been to outsource costly computation to a *query service provider* (\mathcal{SP}), who is often equipped with powerful machines, to provide *query as a service* (QaaS). Thereby, users not only obtain high performance, scalability, and elasticity [13] but also are free from the burdens of managing IT infrastructure.

Because \mathcal{SP} s may not always be trusted, users' privacy may be threatened. In fact, (data or query) confidentiality has been recognized as one of the public's most crucial concerns (*e.g.*, [23]). A stream of research on private query processing has bloomed in the past decade, *e.g.*, in the context of relational databases [16], spatial databases [17] and graphs [3]. However, to date, subgraph queries that preserve the query structure (a.k.a topology) over large networks has not yet been studied. We motivate the problem with an application scenario, which does not require domain knowledge. Others can be found in network medicine¹ and patterns in communication networks.

Example 1.1: Law enforcement agencies are increasingly using social media to solve crimes. According to a recent survey² of 1,221 federal, state and local law enforcement who use social media, four out of five officials used social media to solve crimes. Suppose a law enforcement agency is investigating a set of suspicious individuals over a public social network (*e.g.*, Cloob, which is a Persian-language social networking website, mainly popular in Iran) held in a third party \mathcal{SP} . In order to monitor the online activities of these individuals with one another, the agency wishes to glean information related to interactions between them on the network by issuing a subgraph query representing the relationships between the individuals. Unfortunately, it is possible that the \mathcal{SP} may have been infiltrated by friends or sympathisers of these individuals. Hence, in order to protect the privacy of the intent of the agency from the \mathcal{SP} , the agency cannot expose the subgraph query directly, especially the query structure (*i.e.*, specific relationship pattern between the individuals). How can the agency glean relevant information using a subgraph query while preserving its topological privacy?

Unfortunately, previous work on privacy-preserving graph queries [2], [3], [12], [15], [19], [21], [24] (except [8]) cannot support subgraph queries while preserving their structure. Fan et al. [8] keep *both* query and data graphs private. In contrast, as query clients may often have data access privileges, the privacy requirement of this work is on queries only. As a result, querying significantly *larger* graphs becomes possible. Other work has studied privacy-preserving graph publication [4], [5], [22], [32], [33]. Since the published data are sanitized (*i.e.*, modified), it is not clear how subgraph queries can be supported. Recent studies [10], [11] have addressed the authenticity of the query answers, but not their confidentiality.

It is worth highlighting that the *intrinsic* technical challenge of this research direction is that although the data graph is available to the \mathcal{SP} , the \mathcal{SP} cannot optimize the queries by directly exploiting the structure of the query graphs. In comparison, recent subgraph isomorphism algorithms (*e.g.*, VF2 [7], Turbo_{iso} [14] and QuickSI [25]) intensively *utilize* the query graphs for optimization, which by definition, leaks their structural information. More recently, the work reported in [30] supports “structureless” graph queries. However, the

¹Yildirim, M. A. et al. Drug-target network. Nature Biotech. 25, 1119-1126 (2007).

²www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/about-us/media/press-release.page?id=1342623085481181.

structure is automatically generated by a ranking model and the \mathcal{SP} is aware of the queries.

One may also attempt to solve the problem with a naive solution in which the \mathcal{SP} exhaustively traverses all of the data graph to enumerate all *candidate mappings* (i.e., possible mappings) between the query and the graph and return them to the client for verification. The intuition is that since the query structure is not exploited, its privacy is preserved. However, this is infeasible because the number of candidate mappings is exponential to the graph size in the worst case.

The first challenge of this research is then “*how to reduce a large data graph and subsequently the number of candidate mappings for verification, without exposing the query structure?*”. Our first idea is to determine the minimized *candidate subgraphs* that contain at least a candidate mapping. Then candidate mappings are enumerated from those subgraphs instead of the original graph. In particular, we propose optimizations that use novel *neighborhood containment* of data vertices to minimize the subgraphs. Second, we determine subgraphs (called *candidate matchings*) from a candidate subgraph, where candidate mappings are enumerated. In comparison, in previous work [7], [14], [25] where privacy is not a concern, the matching (i.e., the query graph) is known. We propose a *subgraph cache* and use *neighborhood equivalent classes* to further minimize the number of matchings and mappings.

The second challenge is “*how to verify if a candidate mapping is a subgraph isomorphism mapping without leaking the query structure?*”. We propose a query encoding scheme and adopt an encryption scheme for query graphs. With these, we derive a basic *structure-preserving verification method* that consists of a series of private matrix operations. Moreover, to minimize communication overheads, we propose to use the complement of the encoding for an *enhanced verification method* for queries of bounded sizes.

In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:

- At query time, we first propose a new candidate subgraph exploration in the *absence of query structure*, to reduce a large data graph for query processing. We propose further reducing the size of candidate subgraphs by using neighborhood containment.
- Since candidate matchings are determined from candidate subgraphs, we propose a subgraph cache to prune the candidate matchings that are enumerated.
- We propose a robust encoding scheme and its verification method. We propose a model for the client to determine a proper encoding for his/her query.
- We conduct extensive experiments with real datasets to investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed methods.

Organization. Sec. II introduces the problem. We provide the preliminaries in Sec. III. Sec. IV presents query preprocessing at clients. Sec. V details the structure-preserving optimizations that minimize the candidate mappings. Sec. VI presents the verification of subgraph isomorphism mapping in an encrypted domain. We analyze privacy in Sec. VII. Sec. VIII shows the




Fig. 1. Overview of the system model.

experimental results and Sec. IX compares the related work in the literature. We conclude in Sec. X.

II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

This section formulates the technical problem. More specifically, it presents the system model, attack model, privacy target, and problem statement.

System model. The system model resembles the classical server-client model, which contains two parties (illustrated in Fig. 1): (1) A *Service Provider (SP)* and (2) the *query client* (or simply *client*). The \mathcal{SP} is equipped with powerful computing utilities such as a cloud and hosts a subgraph query service for publicly known graph data G . The client encrypts his/her query Q using a secret key (generated by himself/herself) as Q_k and submits Q_k to the \mathcal{SP} . The \mathcal{SP} then processes the client’s encrypted query Q_k over the data G , and returns an encrypted result to the client. The client decrypts the result to obtain the query answer.

Attack model. We assume the *semi-honest (adversary) model* which is widely used in the database literature [2], [3], [17], [20], where the \mathcal{SP} is *honest-but-curious*. That is, the attacker may be the \mathcal{SP} or another adversary hacking the \mathcal{SP} . The \mathcal{SP} performs computations according to the system model but it may be interested in inferring secrets. For presentation simplicity, we often call the attacker the \mathcal{SP} . We assume that the attacker can be both *eavesdropping* and adopting the *chosen plaintext attack (CPA)* [20].

Privacy target. To facilitate technical discussions, we assume that the privacy target is to protect the *structures* of the query graph Q from the \mathcal{SP} under the attack model defined above. The *structural information* of Q that we consider is the adjacency matrices of Q (i.e., the edge information of Q). It is obvious that the complete structure of a query can be derived from the edge information.

To sum up, the *problem statement* of this paper can be stated as follows: *Given the above system and attack model, we seek an efficient approach to complete the subgraph query service while preserving the privacy target.*

III. PRELIMINARIES AND OVERVIEW

In this section, we first provide preliminary concepts related to subgraph queries. Then, we present an overview of our proposed solution.

A. Subgraph Queries

The graph $G = (V, E, \Sigma, L)$ considered in this paper is an *undirected labeled connected graph*, where $V(G)$, $E(G)$, $\Sigma(G)$ and L are the set of vertices, edges, vertex labels and the function that maps a vertex to its label, respectively. We use $\text{nb}(v, G)$ to denote the set of neighbors of v in G . We use $\text{occ}(\ell, G)$ to represent the number of occurrences of the label




Fig. 2. Overview of our approach.

ℓ in $V(G)$. We use M_G to represent the adjacency matrix of G . $M_G(v_i, v_j)$ is a binary value, where $M_G(v_i, v_j) = 1$ if $(v_i, v_j) \in E(G)$, and otherwise 0. The adjacency matrix M_G represents the edge information. For the clarity of technical details, we present our technique with graphs having vertex labels only. The techniques we propose can be extended to support graphs with edge labels with minor modifications.

Subgraph queries. Def. 3.1 recalls the definition of subgraph isomorphism. We say a graph G is a subgraph of another graph G' iff there exists a subgraph isomorphism mapping (or *mapping* for short) from G to G' , denoted as $G \subseteq G'$ or $\text{subso}(G, G') = \text{true}$. In this paper, we study *subgraph queries* stated as: given a query graph Q and a data graph G , the *subgraph query* is to determine if $\text{subso}(Q, G) = \text{true}$. It is well known that deciding whether Q is the subgraph of G is NP-hard.

Definition 3.1: Given two graphs $G = (V, E, \Sigma, L)$ and $G' = (V', E', \Sigma', L')$, a *subgraph isomorphism mapping* from G to G' is an injective function $f : V(G) \rightarrow V(G')$ such that

- $\forall u \in V(G), f(u) \in V(G'), L(u) = L'(f(u))$; and
- $\forall (u, v) \in E(G), (f(u), f(v)) \in E(G')$.

B. Overview of Our Approach

An overview of our solution is sketched in Fig. 2. Our solution essentially consists of the algorithms at the client side and those at the SP side.

Client-side algorithms. For the algorithms at the client side, we propose performing lightweight optimization and encryption on the query graph Q . (1) We first analyze the query to determine the *starting label* ℓ_s and the *minimum height* h of Q , which are useful for minimizing the number and the sizes of candidate subgraphs of G . A *candidate subgraph* is a subgraph in G that may contain a candidate matching, whereas a *candidate matching* is a subgraph of the candidate subgraph that may generate a *candidate mapping* between Q and G . (2) We then propose a robust encoding scheme for Q (of any size). (3) We adopt the *private-key encryption scheme* CGBE [8] to encrypt the encoded Q to encrypted query Q_k , which is issued to the SP for query processing. (4) The client decrypts the encrypted answer returned by the SP .

Server-side algorithms. The main ideas of the algorithms at the SP side are to localize and minimize the enumeration of candidate mappings between Q and G in candidate subgraphs. (1) The SP first efficiently determines the candidate subgraphs CS_s s (subgraphs) starting from each starting vertex s of the label ℓ_s with the traversal depth h . We propose *neighborhood*

containment (NC) to minimize each CS_s in the absence of the structure of Q . Subsequently, it minimizes the number of candidate mappings to be enumerated by the SP . (2) In each CS_s , the SP enumerates all candidate matchings (CM_s) and candidate mappings. We propose a *canonical labeling-based subgraph cache* and apply *neighborhood equivalent class* (NEC) to further avoid redundant CM_s and candidate mappings, respectively. (3) We derive *structure-preserving verification* SPVerify from [8], where *multiple* encrypted messages R_k (with *negligible false positives*) are returned to the client for decryption of the result.

SPVerify is derived from the seminal subgraph isomorphism algorithm: the Ullmann's algorithm [27]. The major benefit is that its computation flow is simple; hence, we can cast the algorithm into a series of matrix operations (additions and multiplications). Since the encryption of SPVerify supports such matrix operations, privacy is preserved.

We also note that SPVerify may send multiple messages to the client for decryption, which may result in high decryption and network communication costs. Thus we propose SPVerify*. The major difference between SPVerify* and SPVerify is that SPVerify* uses different query encodings according to different query sizes and significantly fewer encrypted messages are returned for decryption, and the query size is smaller than a system-related constant.

IV. QUERY PREPROCESSING AT THE CLIENT

In this section, we introduce a preprocessing method of the query graph. It comprises three steps: (1) retrieving optimization parameters; (2) encoding the query; and (3) encrypting the encoded query. The encrypted query is sent to the SP .

A. Retrieving Parameters for Optimization

In order to minimize (1) the size of each candidate subgraph CS_s and (2) the total number of CS_s s, the SP requires the *minimum height* h of Q and, in the meantime, the starting label ℓ_s of CS_s s that is *infrequent* in G . These parameters (h and ℓ_s) are efficiently retrieved by the client.

Given a starting label ℓ_s , the SP generates CS_s s by a breadth first search bounded by the depth h starting at each vertex of G having the label ℓ_s (to be detailed in Sec. V-A). On the one hand, to minimize the size of each CS_s , we simply find the *spanning tree* of Q with a *minimum height* h rooted from a vertex u , where $u \in V(Q)$ and $\ell_s = L(u)$. Intuitively, the smaller the value h , the smaller the size of each CS_s . Note that we cannot choose the vertex u with $h = 1$ since it trivially leaks the structure of Q (to be analyzed in Sec. VII). When there is a tie (*i.e.*, when vertices u and v of Q have the same




Fig. 3. (a) Illustration of the preprocessing at the client; (b) Construction of candidate subgraphs; and (c) Minimization of CS_s by NC.

h) the client selects the vertex of the label that is *less frequent* in G , simply because the number of CS_s s is bounded by the occurrence of the label in G .

Example 4.1: Fig. 3 (a) shows an example of the selection of the starting label of query Q . The heights of the spanning trees rooted from u_1 , u_3 , and u_4 are 2. u_1 is finally chosen as the starting label as $\text{occ}(0, G) < \text{occ}(2, G)$, where $L(u_1) = 0$, and $L(u_3) = L(u_4) = 2$. u_2 is not considered because the height of its spanning tree is 1.

B. Query Encoding

For presentation brevity, we present an *encoding* scheme for the query Q (in Definition 4.1) to facilitate the discussion of the subsequent encryption scheme. This encoding is extended for further optimization (to be proposed in SubSec. VI-B).

Definition 4.1: The *encoding* of the entries of M_Q are: $\forall u_i, u_j \in V(Q)$,

$$\begin{cases} M_Q(u_i, u_j) = q & \text{if } M_Q(u_i, u_j) = 0; \text{ and} \\ M_Q(u_i, u_j) = 1 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where q is a large prime number.

Example 4.2: Fig. 3 (a) also shows an example of the encoding of Q by Def. 4.1. The entries in M_Q with values 0 are replaced by the large prime q .

C. Query Encryption

Based on the encoding of Q , we adopt our recent private-key encryption scheme [8] (*cyclic graph based encryption scheme* CGBE) to encrypt the encoding of Q (M_Q). CGBE not only allows for efficient encryption and decryption but also supports both partial additions and multiplications, which is the core of efficient structure-preserving computation.

Background on cyclic group. Prior to the presentation of the definition of CGBE, we first recall the preliminaries of cyclic group [20]. Let \mathbb{G} be a group. $p = |\mathbb{G}|$ is denoted as the *order* of \mathbb{G} . In particular, $\forall g \in \mathbb{G}$, the order of \mathbb{G} is the smallest positive integer p s.t., $g^p = 1$. Let $\langle g \rangle = \{g^i : i \in \mathbb{Z}_p, g^i \in \mathbb{Z}_n\} = \{g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{p-1}\}$ denote the set of elements generated by g . The group \mathbb{G} is called *cyclic* if there exists an element $g \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \mathbb{G}$. g is called a *generator* of \mathbb{G} .

CGBE scheme. The cyclic group based encryption scheme is defined as follows.

Definition 4.2: [8] The *cyclic group based encryption scheme* is a *private-key* encryption scheme, denoted as $\text{CGBE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, where

- Gen is a *key generation function*, which generates a secret key x uniformly at random, a cyclic group $\langle g \rangle = \{g^i : i \in \mathbb{Z}_p, g^i \in \mathbb{Z}_n\}$. It outputs the private keys as (x, g) and the value p which is known to the public.

- Enc is an *encryption function*, which takes as input a message m and the secret key (x, g) . It chooses a random value r , and outputs the ciphertext $e = mr g^x \pmod{p}$
- Dec is a *decryption function*, which takes as input a ciphertext e , and the secret key (x, g) . It outputs $mr = eg^{-x} \pmod{p}$

Note that the decryption function Dec in CGBE only decrypts the ciphertext e as a product of the message m and the random value r .

Query encryption. With CGBE, we define the encryption of M_Q as follows.

Definition 4.3: The *encryption* of Q is denoted as Q_k , $Q_k = \{V, M_{Q_k}, \Sigma, L\}$, where $\forall u_i, u_j \in V(Q)$,

$$M_{Q_k}(u_i, u_j) = \text{Enc}(M_Q(u_i, u_j), x, g)$$

Example 4.3: For example, $\forall u_i, u_j$, if $M_Q(u_i, u_j) = 1$, then $M_{Q_k}(u_i, u_j) = \text{Enc}(1) = rg^x \pmod{p}$; and if $M_Q(u_i, u_j) = q$, then $M_{Q_k}(u_i, u_j) = \text{Enc}(q) = rqq^x \pmod{p}$.

Discussion. We remark that the client holds the secret keys (x, g) for decryption and moreover, determines the constant c and an encrypted value I for encrypting verification results (to be discussed in Sec. VI). At last, ℓ_s, h, Q_k, c, I and p are sent to the SP for structure-preserving query processing.

V. MINIMIZED SP MAPPING GENERATION

The query preprocessing at the client side (in Sec. IV) generates $(\ell_s, h, Q_k, c, I, p)$ for the SP . Upon receiving these, the SP performs *structure-preserving* subgraph (termed SPsubgraph), presented in Algo. 1.

As outlined in Sec. I, the SP first minimizes the number of candidate mappings to-be-verified. For brevity, we focus on the most crucial procedures: candidate subgraph generation (Sec. V-A), candidate matching generation (Sec. V-B), and candidate mapping enumeration (Sec. V-C).

A. Candidate Subgraph Generation

To avoid enumerating mappings on a possibly large graph, the SP first generates candidate subgraphs (Fig. 3(b)), where possible mappings can only be embedded in those subgraphs. A candidate subgraph is formally described in Def. 5.1.

Definition 5.1: A *candidate subgraph* started from $s \in V(G)$, denoted as CS_s , is an induced subgraph of G , s.t.

- 1) $L(s) = \ell_s$;
- 2) $\forall v \in V(CS_s)$, v is reachable from s within h hops;
- 3) $\forall \ell, \ell \in \Sigma(CS_s) \Leftrightarrow \ell \in \Sigma(Q)$; and
- 4) $\forall \ell \in \Sigma(CS_s)$, $\text{occ}(\ell, CS_s) \geq \text{occ}(\ell, Q)$.

Example 5.1: Suppose $L(s) = \ell_s = 0$ and $h = 2$. Fig. 3(b) sketches an example of a candidate subgraph CS_s (the grey-colored shadow) rooted from s of G . For each vertex v in

CS_s , v is reachable from s within 2 hops. The set of labels of Q is the same as that of CS_s (i.e., $\Sigma(CS_s) = \Sigma(Q)$). For each label ℓ in CS_s , $\text{occ}(\ell, CS_s) \geq \text{occ}(\ell, Q)$.

Initial generation. GenCandSubGraph (Procedure 1.1, Lines 8-17) shows the generation of candidate subgraphs. Algo. 1 first initializes the CS_s as \emptyset (Line 1). For each vertex $s \in V(G)$, where $L(s) = \ell_s$, it invokes GenCandSubGraph (Line 1). GenCandSubGraph simply generates CS_s by a breadth first search method started from s on G within h hops (Lines 10-15). V_{CS_s} is to record the vertices of CS_s determined so far. For each vertex $v \in V_{CS_s}$, v must be reachable from s within h hops (Lines 13-15), and $L(v) \in \Sigma(Q)$ (Line 13). If $\forall \ell \in \Sigma(CS_s)$, $\text{occ}(\ell, CS_s) \geq \text{occ}(\ell, Q)$ (Line 16), CS_s is set to the induced subgraph of V_{CS_s} in G (Line 17).

Minimization by neighborhood information. Since the sizes of candidate subgraphs have a significant impact on performance, we propose MinCandSubGraph (Procedure 1.2) to minimize the size of each CS_s . MinCandSubGraph is derived based on our notion of *neighborhood containment class* (NC) of CS_s , defined as follows.

Definition 5.2: Given $N = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n\}$ of $V(CS_s)$, N is a *neighborhood containment class* (NC), denoted as $v_1 \sqsubseteq v_2 \sqsubseteq \dots \sqsubseteq v_n$, iff $\forall v_i, v_j \in N$, $i < j$,

- 1) $L(v_i) = L(v_j)$;
- 2) a) $\text{nb}(v_i, CS_s) \subseteq \text{nb}(v_j, CS_s)$, if N is an independent set in CS_s ; or
b) $\text{nb}(v_i, CS_s) \cup \{v_i\} \subseteq \text{nb}(v_j, CS_s) \cup \{v_j\}$, if N is a clique of CS_s .

Based on Def. 5.2, the vertices of a candidate subgraph CS_s exhibit a total ordering with respect to the \sqsubseteq relationships. We have the following lemma for minimizing the size of a candidate subgraph by keeping the ‘‘top’’ vertices in the subgraph. The intuition is that the reduced CS_s preserves all the structures of the original CS_s . The proof is established via a simple contradiction. Due to space limits, we present it in our technical report [9].

Lemma 5.1: Denote an NC N as $\{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n\}$, where $N \subseteq V(CS_s)$ of a graph G . Denote the reduced $V(CS_s)$ (denoted as CS_s^r) is the *induced subgraph* of $V(CS_s) \setminus (N \setminus N_k)$ of CS_s , i.e. $N_k = \{v_{n-k+1}, v_{n-k+2}, \dots, v_n\}$ contains top- k vertices of N that are kept, where $k = \text{occ}(L(v_1), Q)$. Then, the answer of Q on CS_s is the same as that on CS_s^r .

Example 5.2: Reconsider Example 5.1. $\{v_1, v_2\}$ is an NC as $L(v_1) = L(v_2)$, $\text{nb}(v_1, CS_s) \subseteq \text{nb}(v_2, CS_s)$ and $\{v_1, v_2\}$ forms an independent set of CS_s in Fig. 3(c). Since $\text{occ}(1, Q) = 1$, by Lemma 5.1, we keep the top-1 vertex. It can be seen that the answer of Q remains the same after removing either v_1 or v_2 from CS_s . For another example, let’s consider the NC $\{v_4, v_5, v_6\}$ in Fig. 3(c), as the neighborhood of v_4 is contained by that of v_5 . Hence, $v_4 \sqsubseteq v_5$. Similarly, $v_5 \sqsubseteq v_6$. $\{v_4, v_5, v_6\}$ forms an independent set. Again, by Lemma 5.1, we keep only the top-1 vertex, i.e., v_6 . The answer of Q remains the same after removing v_4 and v_5 . All in all, Fig. 4(a) shows CS_s , the candidate subgraph after the minimization.

Algorithm 1 SPsubso (Q_k, G, ℓ_s, h)

Input: The encrypted query graph Q_k , data graph G , starting label ℓ_s and hop h
Output: The encrypted result R_k
1: Initialize $CS_s = CM_s = \emptyset$, $Cache = \emptyset$, and $R_k = 1$
2: **for each** vertex $s \in V(G)$ with the starting label ℓ_s
3: GenCandSubGraph(Q_k, G, s, h, CS_s) /* By Def. 5.1 */
4: MinCandSubGraph(Q_k, CS_s) /* Minimize CS_s */
5: Initialize set $V_{CM_s} = \{s\}$
6: GenCandMatch($V_{CM_s}, Q_k, CS_s, R_k, Cache$) /* By Def. 5.3 */
7: **return** R_k

Procedure 1.1 GenCandSubGraph (Q_k, G, s, h, CS_s)

8: Initialize a **queue** $Visit$ and a **set** V_{CS_s} as empty
9: $Visit.push(s)$, $V_{CS_s.insert(s)}$, $s.hop() = 0$
10: **while** $Visit$ is not empty /* BFS method */
11: $v = Visit.pop()$
12: **if** $(v.hop() = h)$ **continue** /* By 2. in Def. 5.1 */
13: **for each** $v' = \text{nb}(v, G)$, $v' \notin V_{CS_s} \wedge L(v') \in \Sigma(Q_k)$
14: $Visit.push(v')$, $V_{CS_s.insert(v')$
15: $v'.hop() = v.hop() + 1$
16: **while** $\exists \ell \in \Sigma(V_{CS_s})$, s.t. $\text{occ}(\ell, V_{CS_s}) < \text{occ}(\ell, Q_k)$
17: remove all v from $\Sigma(V_{CS_s})$, where $v \in \Sigma(V_{CS_s})$ and $\Sigma(v) = \ell$
18: $CS_s = \text{GenInducedSub}(G, V_{CS_s})$

Procedure 1.2 MinCandSubGraph (Q_k, G, CS_s)

18: **for each** $\ell \in \Sigma(CS_s)$, $\mathcal{N} = \{\}$ /* \mathcal{N} is a set of NC */
19: **for each** $v \in V(CS_s)$, $L(v) = \ell$,
20: **if** $\exists N \in \mathcal{N}$, s.t., /* By Def. 5.2 */
21: (1) $\{v\} \cup N$ forms an independent set (or a clique); and
22: (2) $\text{nb}(v, CS_s)$ (or $\text{nb}(v, CS_s) \cup \{v\}$) contains those of vertices in N .
23: $N.insert(v)$ /* Ordered by \sqsubseteq */
24: **else** create a new N , $N = \{v\}$, $\mathcal{N} = \mathcal{N} \cup \{N\}$
25: **for each** $N \in \mathcal{N}$, $N_k = \{v_{n-k+1}, \dots, v_n\}$, $k = \text{occ}(\ell, Q_k)$
26: Remove $N \setminus N_k$ from CS_s /* By Lemma. 5.1 */

The minimization procedure MinCandSubGraph. Procedure 1.2 shows the minimization of CS_s by NC. For each $\ell \in \Sigma(CS_s)$, a set \mathcal{N} of NC is first initialized as $\{\}$ (Line 18). For each vertex v of CS_s with the label ℓ , sorted in ascending order of $|\text{nb}(v, CS_s)|$ (Line 19) for efficiency, MinCandSubGraph checks if there is an N in \mathcal{N} , such that $N \cup \{v\}$ forms an NC by Def. 5.2 (Line 20). If so, v is then inserted into N (Line 21). Otherwise, the algorithm creates a new $N = \{v\}$ and unions N to \mathcal{N} (Line 22). After the generation of NC of CS_s for the label ℓ , CS_s can be minimized by Lemma 5.1 via keeping the top- k vertices in each N , $N \in \mathcal{N}$, $k = \text{occ}(\ell, Q_k)$ (Lines 23-24).

Complexity. The complexity of the generation of NC in Procedure 1.2 is $\mathcal{O}(d_{max}|V(CS_s)|^2)$, where d_{max} is the maximum degree of the vertices in CS_s . In practice, $|V(CS_s)|$ is often in the order of hundreds, which is small.

B. Candidate Matching Generation

A unique challenge in structure-preserving query processing is that, in the absence of query structure, the SP matches Q_k to *multiple* possible subgraph structures in CS_s . We call such subgraph structures *candidate matchings*. In contrast, if the query structures were not kept secret, the candidate matching was known to be Q . Fig. 4(a) shows four candidate matchings, CM_{s1} , CM_{s2} , CM_{s3} , and CM_{s4} . For each matching, candidate mappings are enumerated. It is evident that a naive enumeration of all candidate matchings can be inefficient. In this subsection, we propose GenCandMatch to efficiently generate candidate matchings. The main idea is to avoid generating redundant matchings from CS_s .




Fig. 4. (a) Construction of candidate matchings; and (b) Enumeration of possible mappings.

Definition 5.3: A candidate matching, denoted as CM_s , is a *connected induced subgraph* of CS_s , *s.t.*

- 1) $|V(CM_s)| = |V(Q)|$; and
- 2) $\forall \ell \in \Sigma(CS_s), \text{occ}(\ell, CM_s) = \text{occ}(\ell, Q)$.

Example 5.3: Fig. 4 (a) lists all the CM_s s enumerated from CS_s . $\forall CM_{s_i}, i \in \{1, \dots, 4\}, |V(CM_{s_i})| = |V(Q)|$, and $\forall \ell \in \Sigma(CS_s), \text{occ}(\ell, CM_{s_i}) = \text{occ}(\ell, Q)$.

Elimination of redundant CM_s . We make two observations from Example 5.3 and Fig. 4. (1) CM_{s2} is *graph-isomorphic* to CM_{s3} . If candidate mappings are generated from CM_{s2} , it is obvious that generating mappings from CM_{s3} is *redundant*. (2) CM_{s1} is a supergraph of CM_{s2} . One can simply generate mappings from CM_{s1} , and skip CM_{s2} and CM_{s3} .

To remove the redundancies mentioned above, it is exactly to solve the following problem: “*given a graph G and a graph database $\mathcal{G} : \{G_1, \dots\}$, how to efficiently determine if G is a subgraph of G' , $G' \in \mathcal{G}$?*” Such a problem has been extensively studied before (e.g., [25], [29]). Existing solutions involve an index computed offline. In our context, candidate matchings are enumerated *online*. Hence, the existing solutions cannot be directly applied.

Canonical labeling-based subgraph cache. Let’s recall a crucial property of canonical labeling. In the context of graph query processing, the canonical labeling of a graph G is denoted as $\text{can}(G)$, and $\text{can}(G) = \text{can}(G')$ *if and only if* G is isomorphic to G' . While the cost for computing the canonical labeling of a graph is not yet known (P or NP), the cost for comparing whether two graphs are isomorphic using the labeling is $O(1)$, once computed. This work adopts the *minimum dfs code* [29] from the literature.

For each query, we propose *Cache* to store $\text{can}(CM_s)$, where each CM_s is the checked candidate matching. Once a new CM'_s is generated, we first check if $\text{can}(CM'_s)$ is already in *Cache*. If so, CM'_s is discarded. Otherwise, we insert $\text{can}(CM'_s)$ into *Cache*. Further, we continue to enumerate subgraphs CM' s from CM'_s , where for each CM' , $|V(CM')| = |V(CM'_s)|$, $CM' \subseteq CM'_s$, and $\text{can}(CM')$ is stored in *Cache*. Putting subgraphs of CM'_s increases the chance of pruning by *Cache*. However, the *trade-off* is that as the query size increases, the computational cost for enumerating all subgraphs of a CM'_s increases exponentially. Thereby, for practical purposes, we enumerate all of the subgraphs CM' s of CM'_s only if $|V(Q)| \leq \delta$, where δ is a user-defined threshold.

Example 5.4: The top of Fig. 4 (a) shows the idea of the canonical labeling-based cache. We assume that δ is 3, and the sequence of the generation of CM_s is from CM_{s1} to CM_{s4} . CM_{s3} is eliminated as $\text{can}(CM_{s2})$ is in *Cache*. If we set

Algorithm 2 GenAllMap (Q_k, CM_s, R_k)

Input: The encrypted query Q_k , candidate matching CM_s and encrypted result R_k
1: Generate \mathbf{M} from Q_k and CM_s
2: Initialize vector used as $\vec{0}$
3: Initialize vector map as $\vec{0}$
4: Construct NEC of CM_s
5: EnumMap(u_0 , used, map, \mathbf{M} , Q_k , CM_s , R_k) /* Enumeration */

Procedure 2.1 EnumMap(u_i , used, map, \mathbf{M} , Q_k , CM_s , R_k)
6: if $i = |V(Q_k)|$
7: if $|V(Q_k)| \leq c$, SPVerify*(map, Q_k , CM_s , R_k) /* Sec. VI-B */
8: else SPVerify(map, Q_k , CM_s , R_k) /* Sec. VI-A */
9: for each $j < |V(CM_s)|, \mathbf{M}(u_i, v_j) = 1 \wedge \text{used}[v_j] = 0$
/* Eliminate redundant mappings by Lemma 5.2 */
10: if $\exists v_{j'}, v_{j'} \simeq v_j, j' < j, \text{used}[v_{j'}] = 0$ /* Lexi. order */
11: continue
12: used[v_j] = 1, map[u_i] = v_j
13: EnumMap(u_{i+1} , used, map, Q_k , CM_s , R_k)
14: used[v_j] = map[u_i] = 0

δ to 5, then CM_{s2} and CM_{s3} are both eliminated, because CM_{s2} is a subgraph of CM_{s1} , and when CM_{s1} is processed, $\text{can}(CM_{s2})$ is inserted into *Cache*.

The ordering in CM_s generation. From Example 5.4, it can be observed that the ordering in CM_s generation affects the performance of the cache, when $|V(Q)| \leq \delta$. Suppose $\delta = 5$. Assume CM_{s2} is generated before CM_{s1} . Then, CM_{s2} is not eliminated. In general, the earlier the larger CM_s s are generated, the better the performance is. Therefore, we find a simple ordering for CM_s generation, by greedily adding vertices to the CM_s by the degree of each vertex.

Due to space limitations, we skip the pseudo-code for CM_s generation (GenCandMatch) [9], which is essentially an enumeration incorporated with the subgraph cache.

C. Candidate Mapping Generation

For a new candidate matching CM_s is generated, GenCandMatch (though its pseudo-code is omitted for brevity) invokes GenAllMap (Algo. 2) to enumerate all possible mappings between Q_k and CM_s .

Elimination of redundant mappings by NEC. Recall that the number of mappings is exponential to the size of CM_s . However, in practice, many mappings are redundant. Hence, before generating the mappings, we utilize *neighborhood equivalent classes* NECs of CM_s (Def. 5.4) to eliminate those redundant mappings. We remark that NEC is a special case of NC. While a similar NEC has been proposed in [14] for query and data graphs, our NEC is applied to data graphs only.

Definition 5.4: Given an NC $N = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n\}$ of CS_s , where N is either an independent set or a clique of CS_s , N is a *neighborhood equivalent class* (NEC), denoted as $v_1 \simeq v_2 \simeq \dots \simeq v_n$, *iff* $\forall v_i, v_j \in N, v_i \sqsubseteq v_j$ and $v_j \sqsubseteq v_i$.

Example 5.5: Let’s consider the example of CM_{s4} in Fig. 4 (a), $\{v_5, v_6\}$ is an NEC as $L(v_5) = L(v_6)$ and $\text{nb}(v_6, CM_{s4}) = \text{nb}(v_5, CM_{s4}) = \{v_3\}$.

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{map1: } R_1 = g^x(rq + \dots + rq) \pmod{p} \\
\text{map2: } R_2 = g^x(rq + \textcircled{q} + \dots + rq) \\
R_k = R_1 \times R_2 \dots \text{violation by (2)} \\
= g^{2x}(rq + \dots)(rq + \textcircled{q} + \dots) \\
\text{(a). SPVerify between } Q_k \text{ and } CM_{s1}
\end{array}
\left|
\begin{array}{l}
R_1 = g^x(r \times \dots \times r) \pmod{p} \\
R_2 = g^x(r \times \textcircled{q} \times \dots \times r) \\
R_k = R_1 + R_2 \dots \text{violation by (6)} \\
= g^x((r \times \dots) + (r \times \textcircled{q} \times \dots)) \\
\text{(b). SPVerify}^* \text{ between } Q_k \text{ and } CM_{s1}
\end{array}
\right.$$

Fig. 5. SPVerify (and SPVerify*) between Q_k and CM_{s1} .

Suppose that u_3 and u_4 (in Fig. 4 (a)) have been mapped to v_5 and v_6 , respectively. It is not necessary to map u_3 and u_4 onto v_6 and v_5 , respectively. This can be formalized as the following lemma. Foremost, we often use $(u_i \mapsto v_i)$ to denote $\text{map}[u_i] = v_i$ for ease of exposition.

Lemma 5.2: Suppose the following are true:

- 1) $u_i, u_j \in V(Q)$, $v_{i'}, v_{j'} \in V(CM_s)$, $L(u_i) = L(u_j) = L(v_{i'}) = L(v_{j'})$;
- 2) $v_{i'} \simeq v_{j'}$;
- 3) $(u_i \mapsto v_{i'})$ and $(u_j \mapsto v_{j'})$.

Let map' be the mapping map except that $(u_i \mapsto v_{j'})$ and $(u_j \mapsto v_{i'})$. Then, map is a candidate mapping between Q and CM_s if and only if map' is also a candidate mapping.

The proof is omitted since it can be established by a simple proof by contradiction. Next, we present the data structures and the mapping generation, that exploit the lemma.

Data structures. (i) A vertex label mapping \mathbf{M} is a $m \times n$ binary matrix, $m = |V(Q_k)|$ and $n = |V(CM_s)|$. Specifically, $\forall u, v$, $\mathbf{M}(u, v) = 1$ if $L(u) = L(v)$, where $u \in V(Q_k)$ and $v \in V(CM_s)$; and otherwise 0. (ii) A vector map of the size $|V(Q_k)|$ is to record a mapping from Q_k to CM_s , $\text{map}[u] = v$ (i.e., $u \mapsto v$) represents that vertex u in Q_k is mapped to vertex v in CM_s . $\text{map}[u] = 0$ if u is not yet mapped. (iii) A vector used of the size $|V(CM_s)|$ is to denote whether the vertex v in CM_s has been mapped to a vertex of Q_k and recorded in map . $\text{used}[v] = 0$ if v is not yet mapped. In other words, $\text{used}[v] = 1$ if and only if $\text{map}[u] = v$ for some $u \in Q_k$.

Algorithm for mapping generation. The detailed algorithm GenAllMap is shown in Algo. 2. It first initializes the data structures, including \mathbf{M} , used and map in Lines 1-3. Line 4 constructs NEC of CM_s , which is similar to that of NC in Procedure 1.2. EnumMap (Lines 6-14) is then invoked to enumerate all possible mappings. A mapping map is constructed vertex by vertex iteratively. Line 9 checks if v_j is a possible map of u_i by \mathbf{M} and used . We then exploit the equivalence class to further check if v_j can be possibly mapped to u_i (Lines 10-12). The vertices in a NEC are checked in a predefined order (e.g, lexicographical order). If $\exists v_{j'} \text{ s.t. } v_{j'} \simeq v_j, j' < j$ and $v_{j'}$ is not used before, then v_j is skipped (Line 10). If v_j passes the check, EnumMap is called recursively (Line 13) until a full mapping is constructed (Line 6).

Example 5.6: Fig. 4(b) illustrates the possible candidate mapping generation for those CM_s s of Example 5.3. Since $v_5 \simeq v_6$ in CM_{s4} , by Lemma 5.2, we only enumerate map_5 , where $u_3 \mapsto v_5$ and $u_4 \mapsto v_6$, but the one with $u_3 \mapsto v_6$ and $u_4 \mapsto v_5$ is eliminated.

VI. SP MAPPING VERIFICATION

Section V presented a series of optimizations that reduce the number of mappings to be generated. Then, for each mapping

map , the SP verifies (in the encrypted domain) if there is no violation in map . The encrypted verification results are aggregated before they are transmitted to the client. In this section, we derive a basic verification (SPVerify) from [8] for our problem setting. Next, we propose an enhanced one (SPVerify*) that aggregates many more messages but requires the query size to be smaller than a user-determined constant.

A. SPVerify

Given a mapping map between Q_k and CM_s , we determine if CM_s is a valid mapping or not. Specifically, we define the violation w.r.t. the encoding of Q as follows: $\exists u_i, u_j \in V(Q)$,

$$\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{Q}}(u_i, u_j) = 1 \wedge (v_{i'}, v_{j'}) \notin E(CM_s) \quad (1)$$

where $v_{i'}, v_{j'} \in V(CM_s)$, $u_i \mapsto v_{i'}$ and $u_j \mapsto v_{j'}$. It states that there exists an edge between vertices u_i and u_j in Q , but there is no corresponding edge between the mapped vertices $v_{i'}$ and $v_{j'}$ in CM_s . We term the case in Formula 1 as a *violation of subgraph isomorphism* (or simply *violation*). A mapping without violation(s) is called a *valid* mapping.

Example 6.1: Let's take the two mappings map1 and map2 of CM_{s1} in Fig. 4 (b) as an example. First, no violation is found in map1 . Second, for map2 , we find that $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{Q}}(u_1, u_3) = 1$ and $(s, v_4) \notin E(CM_{s1})$, where $\text{map2}[u_1] = s$ and $\text{map2}[u_3] = v_4$. Therefore, map2 is invalid.

Algorithm for SPVerify. The intuitive idea of SPVerify is to transform the verification steps into mathematical operations on $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{Q}_k}$ and CM_s , where (1) the violation (Formula 1) can be detected; (2) only matrix additions and multiplications are involved; and (3) the result can be aggregated with one message or multiple messages.

Algo. 3 shows the detailed algorithm. The inputs are a candidate mapping map , an encrypted query graph Q_k , a candidate matching CM_s and an encrypted result R_k . We remark that R_k is to record the aggregated result for CM_s , where R_k is initialized to 1 in Line 1 Algo. 1.

We initialize an intermediate result R_i with a value 0 (Line 1). For each pair of vertices (u_i, u_j) in $V(Q)$ and the mapped vertex pair $(v_{i'}, v_{j'})$ in CM_s (Lines 2-3), the following two steps are performed:

1. Additions (Lines 4-7): if $(v_{i'}, v_{j'}) \notin E(CM_s)$, R_i is set to $(\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{Q}_k}(u_i, u_j) + R_i) \pmod{p}$. This indicates that if (u_i, u_j) is an edge in Q , R_i must not contain a factor of q , and the decryption value of R_i is non-zero (i.e., the current mapping map contains a violation (by Formula 1), which is not a valid mapping). Otherwise, no violation is caused by (u_i, u_j) . This sets R_i to the value $I + R_i \pmod{p}$, where I is an encrypted value with a factor q issued by the client, $I = \text{Enc}(q)$; and
2. Multiplications (Line 8): it aggregates R_i into R_k , by $R_k = R_k \times R_i \pmod{p}$. If there is at least one valid mapping from Q to G , i.e., at least one R_i whose decryption value is zero. The decryption value of R_k must also be zero. Otherwise, it is non-zero. We remark that CGBE leads to *errors* if the number of R_i s aggregated in R_k is larger than a predetermined value M .

Algorithm 3 SPVerify(map, Q_k , CM_s , R_k)

```

1: Initialize  $R_i = 0$ 
2: for each  $u_i, u_j \in V(Q)$ ,  $i < j$ 
3:    $v_{i'} = \text{map}[u_i]$ ,  $v_{j'} = \text{map}[u_j]$ 
   /* Additions */
4:   if  $(v_{i'}, v_{j'}) \notin E(CM_s)$ 
5:      $R_i += \mathbf{M}_{Q_k}(u_i, u_j) \pmod{p}$  /* Aggregate violation */
6:   else
7:      $R_i += I \pmod{p}$  /* No violation,  $I = \text{Enc}(q)$  */
   /* Multiplications */
8:  $R_k \times = R_i \pmod{p}$  /* Decompose  $R_k$  after aggregating  $M$   $R_i$  */

```

Example 6.2: Fig. 5(a) depicts an example of SPVerify between Q_k and CM_{s1} . There are two mappings from Q_k to CM_{s1} in Fig. 4(b). In map1, all the factors in R_1 contain q since map1 is a valid mapping. However, in map2, since there exists a violation between (u_1, u_3) and (s, v_4) , there is a factor in R_2 that has no prime q . $R_k = R_1 \times R_2 \pmod{p}$.

Decryption at the client. After receiving all the encrypted messages R_k , the client performs two main steps:

- For each R_k , the client computes the *plaintext* of R_k by $R'_k = \text{Dec}(R_k, x, g)^M$; and
- The client computes the final result by $R = R'_k \pmod{q}$.

R equals zero if and only if there is at least one valid mapping from Q to G and thus, $\text{subIso}(Q, G) = \text{true}$.

Example 6.3: We show the decryption at the client by using the example in Fig. 5 (a). Assume $M = 2$. The encrypted message R_k only aggregates two R_i s. The client generates the g^{-2x} , computes $R'_k = R_k \times g^{-2x} \pmod{p}$, and finally computes $R = R'_k \pmod{q}$. The result is zero, which indicates Q is a subgraph of G .

Decomposition scheme. We recall that the decryption (Dec in Def. 4.2) uses the arithmetic modulo p . The message $m * r$ must not exceed p . When there are too many R_i s multiplied into R_k , the product (in the plaintext domain) may exceed p . Subsequently, the client will not obtain the correct plaintext under the arithmetic system. Therefore, we decompose the product into smaller numbers and the client decrypts those numbers instead. Through Formula 2 below, we can determine the maximum number of R_i s to be aggregated in R_k (M):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Len}(p) &\geq M(\text{Len}(q) + \text{Len}(r)) \\ \Leftrightarrow M &\leq \frac{\text{Len}(p)}{(\text{Len}(q) + \text{Len}(r))}, \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $\text{Len}(p)$ is the size of p .

Let's say we set $M = 10$. From experiments, the number of mappings (after our minimizations) for our queries is around 500 on average. Each message is 2048 bits in size. Thus, the communication cost is around 12.8KB, which is very small.

False positives. Due to CGBE [8], the two matrix operations in SPVerify introduce negligible false positives: (1) additions with computing R_i (Lines 4-7); and (2) multiplications with computing R_k in each decomposed number (Line 8). However, the probabilities of the above two false positives are negligible.

The probability of false positives from the aggregation (additions) while computing R_i and the multiplication of R_k s in each decomposed number are respectively stated in Props 6.1 and 6.2, which can be established by simple arithmetics [9]. Since the proofs are similar to those presented in [8], we omit them for the interest of space.

Algorithm 4 SPVerify*(map, Q_k , CM_s , R_k)

```

1: Initialize  $R_i = 1$ 
2: for each  $u_i, u_j \in V(Q)$ ,  $i < j$ 
3:    $v_{i'} = \text{map}[u_i]$ ,  $v_{j'} = \text{map}[u_j]$ 
   /* Multiplications */
4:   if  $(v_{i'}, v_{j'}) \notin E(CM_s)$ 
5:      $R_i \times = \mathbf{M}_{Q_k}(u_i, u_j) \pmod{p}$  /* Aggregate violation */
6:   else
7:      $R_i \times = I \pmod{p}$  /* No violation,  $I = \text{Enc}(1)$  */
   /* Additions */
8:  $R_k += R_i \pmod{p}$ 

```

Proposition 6.1: The probability of false positives in R_i is $\frac{1}{q}$, which is negligible.

Proposition 6.2: The probability of false positives in R_k is $1 - e^{-\frac{M}{q}}$, which is negligible, in each decomposed number.

B. Optimized SPVerify for Queries of Bounded Sizes

Each encrypted message R_k sent by SPVerify aggregates at most M messages R_i s. In this subsection, we propose SPVerify*, which significantly reduces the number of messages returned, and in turn reduces both the communication and computational costs at the client. The main idea behind SPVerify* is to *use multiplications to detect violations* since queries are often small and *use additions to aggregate R_i s*. Hence, the value of R_k may not exceed p even after many aggregations. However, a tradeoff of SPVerify* is that the query size must be bounded by a pre-determined constant c .

Similar to SPVerify, SPVerify* also detects the violation by multiplications and additions. In order to achieve that, we first define a *complement* encoding of the query (see Def. 6.1).

Definition 6.1: The *encoding* of the entries of \mathbf{M}_Q are:

$\forall u_i, u_j \in V(Q)$,

$$\begin{cases} \mathbf{M}_Q(u_i, u_j) = 1 & \text{if } \mathbf{M}_Q(u_i, u_j) = 0 \\ \mathbf{M}_Q(u_i, u_j) = q & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where q is a large prime number.

In relation to Def. 6.1, we adopt Formula 1 to state the violation: $\forall u_i, u_j \in V(Q)$,

$$\mathbf{M}_Q(u_i, u_j) = q \wedge (v_{i'}, v_{j'}) \notin E(G) \quad (3)$$

where $v_{i'}, v_{j'} \in V(G)$, $u_i \mapsto v_{i'}$ and $u_j \mapsto v_{j'}$.

Algorithm for SPVerify*. For ease of comparison, we present the pseudo-code of SPVerify* (shown in Algo. 4) in the style of SPVerify. The inputs and the initialized data structures are the same as SPVerify, except that R_k is initialized to 0. The two main steps of SPVerify* can be highlighted as follows:

1. Multiplications (Lines 4-7): according to the violation (by Formula. 3), if $(v_{i'}, v_{j'}) \notin E(CM_s)$, set R_i as the value $\mathbf{M}_{Q_k}(u_i, u_j) \times R_i \pmod{p}$. This indicates that as long as (u_i, u_j) is an edge in Q , R_i must contain the factor q , and the decryption value is zero (*i.e.*, the current mapping map contains a violation). Otherwise, R_i is set to a value $I \times R_i \pmod{p}$, where I is an encrypted value *without* factor q issued by the client, $I = \text{Enc}(1)$; and
2. Additions (Line 8): it aggregates R_i to R_k , where $R_k = R_k + R_i \pmod{p}$. If there is at least one valid mapping from Q to G (*i.e.*, at least one R_i whose plain text is

non-zero). The decrypted value of R_k must also be non zero. Otherwise, it is zero.

Example 6.4: Fig. 5 (b) illustrates an example of SPVerify*. Similarly, since there is no violation in map1, all the factors in R_1 do not contain q . Regarding map2, since there is a violation, R_2 contains a factor q . $R_k = R_1 + R_2 \pmod{p}$.

Decryption at the client. The decryption is modified as:

- The client computes the message encoded in R_k as $R'_k = \text{Dec}(R_k, x, g)^{m(m-1)/2}$, where $m = |V(Q)|$; and
- The client computes the final result by $R = R'_k \pmod{q}$.

R equals non-zero if and only if there is at least one valid mapping from Q to G . Thus $\text{sublso}(Q, G) = \text{true}$.

Example 6.5: We show the decryption in Fig. 5 (b). For simplicity, we assume that R_k only aggregates R_1 and R_2 . The client generates g^{-6x} , computes $R'_k = R_k \times g^{-6x} \pmod{p}$, and finally computes $R = R'_k \pmod{q}$. The result is non-zero which indicates that Q is a subgraph of G .

Determining the constant c to decide when to use SPVerify or SPVerify*. In SPVerify*, multiplications are used to aggregate violations by edges in CM_s (Line 4 in Algo. 4), instead of aggregating numerous mapping results (R_i in Line 8 of Algo. 3). Similarly, when R_i (Lines 4-7) in Algo. 4 exceeds p , the client cannot recover the plaintext. The number of multiplications for each R_i is directly related to the size of the query ($|V(Q)|$). We can determine the maximum size of the query, denoted as c , using the following inequality.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Len}(p) &\geq \frac{c(c-1)}{2}(\text{Len}(q) + \text{Len}(r)) \\ \Leftrightarrow 0 &\geq c^2 - c - \frac{2\text{Len}(p)}{\text{Len}(q) + \text{Len}(r)} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Putting these together, in Lines 7-8 of Algo. 2, once $|V(Q)| \leq c$, the \mathcal{SP} uses SPVerify*. Otherwise, it uses SPVerify.

False positives. Since both SPVerify and SPVerify* use CGBE, we can obtain that the probabilities of false positives of SPVerify* are also *negligible*. Their proofs are almost identical to those of Props. 6.1 and 6.2 and [8], and hence, omitted.

VII. PRIVACY ANALYSIS

In this section, we prove the privacy of the encryption method and SPsublso. The attack model is the one defined in Sec. II. The attackers or \mathcal{SP} s are eavesdroppers and can adopt chosen plaintext attack (CPA) [20].

Privacy of the encryption method. CGBE is adopted to encrypt the query graph in this paper. The privacy of CGBE and M_{Q_k} can be recalled from [8].

Lemma 7.1: [8] CGBE is secure against CPA. M_{Q_k} is preserved from the \mathcal{SP} against the attack model under CGBE.

Then, based on Lemma 7.1, we have the following.

Proposition 7.1: The structure of the query is preserved from the \mathcal{SP} against the attack model under CGBE.

Proof: (Sketch) The proof can be derived from Lemma 7.1. After receiving Q_k , the \mathcal{SP} cannot break the M_{Q_k} since they are secure against CPA. V , Σ and L do not contain structural information. Thus, the structure of query is preserved from the \mathcal{SP} against the attack model. ■

Privacy of SPsublso. SPsublso mainly consists of five steps: (1) GenCandSubGraph; (2) MinCandSubGraph; (3) GenCandMatch; (4) GenAllMap; and (5) SPVerify (or SPVerify*). We now analyze the privacy of each step as follows. However, first, the analysis requires some notations. We denote a function $P(m, h, \Sigma)$ that returns all possible graphs of m vertices with a minimum height h and the labels Σ . $|P(m, h, \Sigma)|$ is exponential to the value m and the size of Σ .³ Let $\mathcal{A}(Q)$ is a function that returns 1 if \mathcal{SP} is able to determine the exact structure of Q , and 0 otherwise. The probability that the \mathcal{SP} can determine the structure of the query Q is denoted as $Pr[\mathcal{A}(Q) = 1]$. Given a query Q and (m, h, Σ) , the probability of determining its structure is $Pr[\mathcal{A}(Q) = 1] = 1/|P(m, h, \Sigma)|$.

Proposition 7.2: Under GenCandSubGraph, MinCandSubGraph, GenCandMatch and GenAllMap, $Pr[\mathcal{A}(Q) = 1] = 1/|P(m, h, \Sigma)|$.

Proof: (Sketch) The proof is established by one main fact: \mathcal{SP} does not utilize any structural information of the query, except the value h in the algorithm.

- GenCandSubGraph utilizes ℓ_s , h , Q_k and G to generate all the CS_s s;
- MinCandSubGraph minimizes the size of each CS_s by using only the structure of CS_s itself;
- GenCandMatch utilizes Q_k and CS_s to generate CM_s s;
- GenAllMap enumerates all the possible mappings maps between Q_k and CM_s .

The \mathcal{SP} cannot learn the structure of Q by invoking them, and thus the probability of determining a structure remains $Pr[\mathcal{A}(Q) = 1] = 1/|P(m, h, \Sigma)|$. ■

In SPVerify and SPVerify*, \mathcal{SP} sends messages to the clients. The clients may terminate the algorithm when a mapping is found, which may leak information to the \mathcal{SP} . Such a leak can be quantified in the following proposition.

Proposition 7.3: Under SPVerify or SPVerify*, the following hold for :

- If Q is a subgraph of G , $Pr[\mathcal{A}(Q) = 1] = 1/|S|$, where $S = \{G | G \in P(m, h, \Sigma), G \subseteq CM_s, \text{ where } CM_s \in \text{Cache}\}$; and
- If Q is not a subgraph of G , $Pr[\mathcal{A}(Q) = 1] = 1/|P(m, h, \Sigma)|$.

Proof: (Sketch) Since the algorithm SPVerify* is similar to that of SPVerify, due to the space constraint, we prove it with SPVerify only. The proof involves two aspects:

(1) \mathcal{SP} can never determine any structural information from the mathematical computations in each steps of SPVerify:

Recall that SPVerify comprises a fixed number of mathematical operations in the encrypted domain in Algo. 3.

- Lines 4-7 invoke a constant number of additions of M_{Q_k} and R_i , and only structure of CM_s is considered. More specifically, $\forall i, j$, m^2 additions are invoked for $M_{Q_k}(i, j)$ and R_i ; and

³We remark that if $h = 1$, the \mathcal{SP} is able to infer that the vertex with ℓ_s must connect to other vertices in Q . To avoid this special case, as mentioned in Sec. IV, we choose the starting vertex where h equals or larger than 2.

TABLE I
STATISTICS OF THE REAL-WORLD DATASETS

Graph G	$ V(G) $	$ E(G) $	Avg. Degree	$ \Sigma(G) $
DBLP	317,080	1,049,866	6.62	199
LiveJournal	3,997,962	34,681,189	17.34	1355

- Line 8 requires one multiplication on each R_i and R_k .

Based on Lemma 7.1, all the intermediate computations results are securely protected against the attack model. Moreover, each step of SPVerify has a constant number of operations in the encrypted domain. \mathcal{SP} cannot learn any information from them.

(2) \mathcal{SP} may only infer some structural information from the message communications:

Recall that once M R_i s are aggregated into R_k , R_k is returned to the client, the client may decide to terminate SPVerify after receiving R_k s. There are two cases:

- Suppose there is at least one valid R_k such that Q is a subgraph of G . In this case, Q must be graph (or subgraph) isomorphic to one of CM_s in $Cache$. Therefore, $Pr[A(Q) = 1] = 1/|S|$, where $S = \{G | G \in P(m, h, \Sigma), G \subseteq CM_s, CM_s \in Cache\}$; and
- If the client does not terminate the algorithm, \mathcal{SP} does not know if there is a valid R_k or not. Thus, the probability of determining the structure of Q is still $Pr[A(Q) = 1] = 1/|P(m, h, \Sigma)|$. ■

Based on Prop. 7.3, we note that the client can make a tradeoff between privacy and response times by terminating the algorithm as late as acceptable.

VIII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

This section presents an experimental evaluation of our techniques with popular real datasets.⁴ The results show that our techniques are efficient and our optimizations are effective.

The platform. We conducted all our experiments on a machine with an Intel Core i7 3.4GHz CPU and 16GB memory running Windows 7 OS. All techniques were implemented on C++, and CGBE was implemented on the GMP library. We simulate the bandwidth as 10Mbps/s.

Data and query sets. We benchmarked real-world datasets: DBLP, Amazon, Youtube, and LiveJournal.⁵ Due to space limitations, we opt to report the performance of DBLP and LiveJournal, since others exhibit similar performance characteristics. Other performance details of Amazon and Youtube are reported in [9]. Since the vertices do not have labels, we adopt the approach that uses the degree of the vertex as its label [18]. (We tested to assign vertex labels by randomly choosing labels from predefined domains. We noted similar trends. Due to space limits, we skip reporting them.) Some statistics of the datasets are shown in Table I.

For each dataset, we generated two types of queries [26]: (1) BFS queries (BFS) and (2) DFS queries (DFS) by random BFS and DFS methods, respectively. Both BFS and DFS contain query sets $Q3$ - $Q8$, wherein each Q_n contains 1,000

⁴As discussed in Sec. I, previous studies are not applicable to our problem, since they heavily exploit query structures, which are secret in this work.

⁵The datasets are available at <http://snap.stanford.edu/>.

query graphs, and n is the number of vertices of each query of the query set. h of the query sets are around 3-4 on average.

Default values of the parameters. In CGBE, the prime p and q are 2048 bits and 32 bits, respectively. The random number r is 32 bits. The largest value c is 12 by Formula 4. However, to study the performance of both SPVerify* and SPVerify, we first set c to 6, by default. That is, if $|V(Q)| \leq 6$, we used SPVerify*. Otherwise, we used SPVerify. We finally investigated the effectiveness of SPVerify* with $c = 11$. For SPVerify*, we set $M = 100$ by default (*i.e.*, we aggregated 100 R_i s into each R_k). For SPVerify, we set $M = 10$ only. Unless specified otherwise, $\delta = 5$. Under these settings, no false positives was detected from the entire experiments.




Fig. 6. Average preprocessing time at the client.

A. Performance at the Client Side

Preprocessing time at the client. We report the average preprocessing time of the query Q at the client side on all datasets in Fig. 6. Specifically, the preprocessing of Q includes (1) the computation for ℓ_s and h ; and (2) the encryption of Q by CGBE. We observe that the average times for each query on all datasets are around 4ms, which shows that the preprocessing is in cognitively negligible.




Fig. 7. Average received encrypted message size at the client.

The sizes of messages received by the client. We report the sizes of the encrypted messages R_k s that the client received in Fig. 7. Due to the optimizations by SPsublso, the largest sizes of R_k s (at $Q6$) are around 13KB on LiveJournal, which can be efficiently transmitted via today's networks. For $Q7$ - $Q8$, as we set c to 6 (by default), SPsublso uses SPVerify. The number of R_i s aggregated in each R_k is 10. Thus, the message sizes for $Q7$ - $Q8$ are larger. Since the maximum value of c is 11 in the current configuration, SPVerify* can be used to produce much smaller messages (to be discussed with Fig. 14).




Fig. 8. Average decryption time at the client.

The decryption time at the client. After receiving the encrypted messages R_k s, the client decrypts R_k s. The decryption time is shown in Fig. 8. Since the sizes of R_k s are small and the decryption method is simple, the average decryption times at the client are correspondingly fast at most 16ms.




Fig. 9. Average total running time at the SP .

B. Performance at the SP Side

The total runtime at the SP . Fig. 9 shows the average total runtime at the SP on all datasets, which is exactly the runtime of SPsublo. For the simplicity of performance analysis, we terminated SPsublo once the client found at least one valid mapping. (The client may postpone the termination to achieve higher privacy [8], although that introduces small but non-trivial overhead to SPsublo.) It is not surprising that the runtimes increase exponentially with the query sizes. For $Q8$, the largest runtime is around 12s on LiveJournal. However, the running times for small queries ($Q3$ - $Q6$) are well below 600ms for all datasets.

We further report the breakdowns of the total runtimes of SPsublo: (1) GenCandSubGraph and MinCandSubGraph; and (2) GenCandMatch and SPVerify. For the DBLP dataset, the breakdown percentages of both query sets are similar: 30% and 70%. For LiveJournal, they are 53% and 47%.




Fig. 10. Average % of reduced vertices in CS_s by NC.

The effectiveness of minimization of CS_s . In Fig. 10, we show the average percentage of the reduced vertices of CS_s by NC in MinCandSubGraph. We observe that MinCandSubGraph reduces around 40% of the vertices of CS_s s on DBLP. However, for LiveJournal, the percentage (on average) is around 20%.

In our experiment, we note that a small fraction of queries have CS_s s that contain numerous candidate mappings. The reason is that SPsublo cannot exploit query structures for optimizations. In this case, for each CS_s , we compute an upper bound of the number of candidate mappings of a query by simple calculations on CS_s . For those candidate subgraphs that may exceed 100,000 mappings, we transmit the candidate subgraphs to the client to do sublo (e.g., using [14] or [7]). The percentage of such queries is very small, at most 1% for $Q3$ - $Q7$ on all datasets. For $Q8$, the percentage is only 10%. In other words, most subgraph queries are successfully outsourced to the SP .




Fig. 11. Average % of the pruned redundant CM_s by $Cache$.

The effectiveness of the elimination of redundant CM_s . Fig. 11 shows the average percentage of redundant CM_s s pruned by $Cache$ in GenCandMatch. We note that as the

query size increases, the effectiveness of $Cache$ increases. For $Q3$ - $Q4$ of all datasets, the percentage of the elimination of redundant CM_s increases to 80%. For $Q5$ - $Q8$ on DBLP, the percentages are stable at around 80%. We note the graph structures of LiveJournal are diverse and there are many distinct CM_s s. The effectiveness of $Cache$ then decreases from 80% to 50% for $Q5$ - $Q8$. This is also reflected by the fact that the sizes of the encrypted messages R_k s are the largest for LiveJournal (see Fig. 7).




Fig. 12. Average $Cache$ size at SP .

The memory consumption of $Cache$. We report the memory consumption of $Cache$ in Fig. 12. As we only store the hash code of the canonical labeling of each distinct CM_s , the memory consumption is very small (at most 25MB).




Fig. 13. Average % of the pruned redundant mappings by NEC. **The effectiveness of pruning redundant mappings by NEC.** We report the pruning of redundant mappings by using NEC in Fig. 13. We observe that, for most of the queries, we pruned approximately 20% of redundant mappings on average. This further saves on computations in SPVerify and SPVerify*.




Fig. 14. Average size of messages R_k s when $c = 11$.

The number of aggregated messages by SPVerify*. In Fig. 7, since c was set to 6 by default, we used SPVerify for $Q7$ - $Q8$, where each R_k is an aggregate of M messages and $M = 10$. As discussed, the messages are small. To study SPVerify*, we then set $c = 11$. We used $Q8$ with DFS and varied the values of M from 10 to 100. Fig. 14 shows the detailed performance of all datasets. We report that for $M = 10$, the message size is the same as those values of $Q8$ DFS in Fig. 7. Importantly, as M increases, the message size decreases accordingly.

Summary. The experiments show that the computation times at the client were in the order of milliseconds. The messages transferred were small. Most computation was outsourced to the SP . Further, the proposed optimizations were effective.

IX. RELATED WORK

While there has been some work on privacy-preserving query processing, due to space limitations, we can only include the work relevant to graph queries.

Privacy-preserving graph queries. Cao et al. [3] proposed supporting subgraph queries over an encrypted database with a

number of small graphs. Their work protects the privacy of the query, index and data features. However, this work does not address the subgraph isomorphism verification of candidate graphs. Cao et al. [2] studied tree pattern queries over encrypted XML documents. The traversal order for each query (required by their method) is predetermined. In the context of graphs, the order cannot be predetermined. He et al. [15] analyzed vertex reachability, while preserving edge privacy. Gao et al. [12] proposed neighborhood-privacy protection for the shortest distance. It aims to preserve the neighborhood connections and the shortest distances between vertices. Mouratidis et al. [24] proposed a shortest path computation with no information leakage using the PIR protocol [6], whose high computational cost is a known concern. Karwa et al. [19] addressed *subgraph counts* by satisfying the differential privacy of edges. Yin et al. [31] studied private reachability queries. Fan et al. [10], [11] proposed *authenticated* subgraph query services under the classical data outsourcing setting. A subgraph isomorphism verification method that keeps *both* query and data graphs secret was proposed [8]. To our knowledge, this is the first work that subgraph queries are protected, whereas the data graph is publicly known.

Subgraph isomorphism. Ullmann [27] proposed a seminal algorithm for subgraph isomorphism. The basic idea is a search with backtracking with respect to the matrix that represents possible isomorphic relationships. In the last decade, several algorithms (*e.g.*, VF2 [7], QuickSI [25] and Turbo_{ISO} [14]) have been proposed to enhance performance significantly. They all require to *traversing* the query on graph data. For instance, VF2 [7] relies on a set of state transitions and traversals on the graph and query. QuickSI [25] optimizes the ordering in traversals of graphs. Turbo_{ISO} [14] exploits neighborhood information and local regions of vertices. Turbo_{ISO} also involves determining an optimal traversal in query processing. However, the traversals themselves carry topological information, which makes privacy preservation complicated if it is possible at all. Wu et al. [30] supports structureless graph queries, as the query structure is automatically formulated. However, the queries are known to the \mathcal{SP} .

X. CONCLUSION

This paper studies the first practical private approach for subgraph query service: asymmetric structure-preserving subgraph query processing. Our techniques include deriving minimized candidate subgraphs to significantly reduce the number of candidate mappings, generating candidate matchings and then candidate mappings without redundancies and verifying candidate mappings without leaking query structures. Our experiments confirm that our techniques are efficient and effective. A future work is to support data values associated with the graphs. We also plan to apply distributed computing once candidate subgraphs are generated.

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